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THE ZAPP COMPLEX 
The text for today's sermon comes from a lecture by Morris 
Zapp, the inimitable literature professor created by David Lodge in 
his novels, Changing Places 1 and Small World.2 (If you haven't 
read them, stop everything right now and go get copies; they're ter-
rific.) At one point, the editors of this journal considered adding a 
regular "Law and Literature" feature by Professor Zapp. Apart 
from some apprehension about the copyright laws, the scheme 
foundered because we were unable to compose an essay that would 
do justice to the great Zapp. 
Fortunately, Lodge is gifted with greater imagination. In 
Small World, he supplies a complete lecture by Zapp. The scene is 
a particularly depressing professional meeting at an abysmal provin-
cial college in England at which Zapp has been invited to speak, an 
invitation he has accepted largely because England is on the way to 
his next conference in Milan. This conference in England sets the 
scene for the entire book, which paradoxically takes place mostly in 
other countries. The "small world" to which the title refers is not 
provincial England, but rather the cozy world of international aca-
demic conferences, in which the same intimate group of academics 
meets again and again. 
Zapp's lecture is mostly a prolonged and fairly graphic com-
parison between literary criticism and watching a striptease-a 
comparison received with some distaste by his audience-but the 
paragraph of interest to us comes earlier. Zapp, we are told, deliv-
ered the lecture while "striding up and down the platform with his 
notes in one hand and a fat cigar in the other." Elsewhere in the 
book, we learn of his wretched taste in sports jackets. Meanwhile, 
the professor chairing the meeting "assumed an aspect of glazed 
impassivity, but by imperceptible angles the corners of his mouth 
turned down at more and more acute angles and his spectacles slid 
further and further down his nose .... " Despite his poor reception 
at the conference in Rummidge, England, Zapp will peddle the 
same speech all over Europe and then at the MLA convention in 
New York. 
I. D. LODGE, CHANGING PLACES (1979). CHANGING PLACES takes place during the 
heart of the student uprisings of the sixties, and also in the heyday of trans·Atlanticism. 
2. D. LODGE, SMALL WORLD: AN ACADEMIC ROMANCE (1984). 
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Enough wind-up. Small World is so inspired that we will end 
up quoting the whole thing, landing ourselves in real copyright 
trouble. (It's tempting at least to tell you about Zapp's ex-wife, 
Desiree, the feminist novelist, or about Robin Dempsey and the 
computer program that nearly talked him into suicide, but you just 
will have to get the book yourself.) Here is the part of the lecture 
that relates to today's sermon: 
I used to be a Jane Austen man. I think I can say in all modesty I was the Jane 
Austen man. I wrote five books on Jane Austen, every one of which was trying to 
establish what her novels meant-and, naturally, to prove that no one had properly 
understood what they meant before. Then I began a commentary on the works of 
Jane Austen, the aim of which was to be utterly exhaustive, to examine the novel 
from every conceivable angle-historical, biographical, rhetorical, mythical, struc-
tural, Freudian, Jungian, Marxist, existentialist, Christian, allegorical, ethical, phe-
nomenological, archetypal, you name it. So that when each commentary was 
written, there would be nothing further to say about the novel in question. 
Ultimately, however, Zapp came to reject this entire project.3 
What should interest law professors is not Zapp's later evalua-
tion of his project, but the project itself. The Zappian quest for the 
definitive reaches its apogee in the modern law review article: 196 
pages with 557 footnotes, recounting all of the judicial doctrine, all 
previous scholarship, all prior theories, propounding a new ap-
proach and then applying it in excruciating detail to every possible 
hypothetical. Though often bemoaned, this style remains dominant 
in contemporary legal scholarship. 
The Zapp complex sheds light on otherwise inexplicable as-
pects of legal scholarship. Consider a recent 187-page article in the 
Michigan Law Review about the dormant commerce clause,4 prob-
ably the dullest subject in constitutional law. The author is said by 
one of our colleagues (who is himself unusually sagacious) to be 
about the smartest law professor in America. Why, then, has he 
unleashed this monstrosity upon the world? Someone that smart 
certainly must realize that no one outside of the city limits of Ann 
Arbor will ever read the article from beginning to end. But of 
course that's not the point. No one needs to read the article at all. 
Even without reading it, everyone knows that this is the definitive 
work on the dormant commerce clause. After such a brilliant mind 
has devoted such minute attention to such a narrow topic, what 
could possibly be left to be said? 
3. He began to realize that eliminating all of the mystery in favor of a definitive work 
would (to use Zapp's own metaphor) be equivalent to replacing a striptease with a gynecolog-
ical examination. Perhaps that is a part of Zapp's thesis that the law school world may not be 
ready for. 
4. Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of the Dormant 
Commerce Clause, 87 MICH. L. REv. 1091 (1986). 
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The quest for the definitive explains much about legal scholar-
ship. On the surface, it seems irrational for each of ten articles on a 
subject to begin by recounting the entire previous history of the sub-
ject, propound a new approach (which none of the other articles 
finds valid), and then devote many pages to working out the minute 
details of an approach that realistically will never be applied by any-
one except the author. The motive, however, is now clear: it is the 
desire to be definitive.s 
Each author, like Zapp, dreams of writing the last word on the 
subject: the work on the first amendment, or equal protection, or 
judicial review that says it all, so that no one will ever have to read 
anything else again. In the future, all that will remain is for courts 
(and perhaps some academic proteges) to apply the approach faith-
fully. Someday, each author dreams, the pundits in the Harvard 
faculty commons will mention the subject matter as a former source 
of controversy "but of course old Jones cleared all that up in '88, 
not much left to say about [free speech or judicial review or 
whatever it is]." (Old Jones, of course, is by now the holder of a 
distinguished chair at Yale or someplace, having written his way 
out of Whatsamatta U. with the same definitive article.) It is this 
dream that explains the length, footnoting, and pedanticism of the 
typical law review article. 
And yet, it's all quite futile. Each definitive article takes its 
place on the shelf beside its definitive predecessors. Each will be 
cited and shrugged aside in the early footnotes of its definitive suc-
cessors, while being largely ignored by the courts. Because of this 
craving for the definitive, each is choked with excessive footnotes 
and turgid prose, with pages and pages of tedious review of what 
everyone in the field knows anyway. Each will be guilty of indicta-
ble Crimes Against the English Language, an offense soon to be 
recognized by international law. And none will accomplish any-
thing of importance except to adorn the resume of the author with 
yet another prestigious citation (certainly not a goal to scoff at). 
What is wrong with this venture is not just the horrible style it 
promotes, but its very purpose in ending discussion. Don't we all 
know in our hearts how boring our jobs would be if we did have the 
ultimate theories of judicial review, free speech, etc., at our finger 
tips? And how presumptuous of us it is to think that we can solve 
problems of this order for all time. Does anyone really envision our 
5. To be fair, there is one sub-category of articles that have a different explanation: 
tenure pieces. These suffer from the same vices, but the explanation is simply a desire to 
impress the tenured faculty with the author's industry, so that even if they don't find the 
thesis very clever they will still admire the thoroughness of the research. 
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descendants a century from now faithfully applying the free speech 
test announced in last month's law review article? 
Saying the last word is, ultimately, an attempt to silence the 
audience. Instead of lecturing our colleagues, perhaps we should be 
talking these issues over with them. 
We might begin to think of scholarly works, not as crystallized 
monuments to truth, but rather as steps in what Richard Rorty 
calls the "continuing conversation of mankind." When we're very 
lucky, we can clarify an issue or settle some small dispute, making a 
permanent contribution to the discussion, but to think that we can 
ever have the last word is the worst of all scholarly delusions. 
All of which takes us rather far from Morris Zapp and his 
travails. It would be an affront to the Zappian spirit to pretend that 
his presence in this essay is anything less than frivolous. Admit-
tedly, the same point could have been made without referring to 
Zapp, but in that event, however, the purchase price of the book 
would not have been tax deductible6 and this essay would have lost 
its title. No one would have appreciated those points better than 
the immortal Zapp himself. 
D.A.F. 
6. Subject to the two percent floor in § 67(a) of the Internal Revenue Code (as 
amended in 1986). 
